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INTRODUCTION
In his essay, Mitsubishi, Investor-StateArbitration, and the Law of
State Immunity,' Professor Brower, with characteristic elegance and
insight, offers a framework which is indeed thought-provoking.
Suitably abstract, his comments of course operate at several levels. In
addition to identifying some under-appreciated links among
Mitsubishi, state immunity and investor-state arbitration, his essay
alludes to a cluster of concrete developments in investor-state
arbitration that are unfolding apace. Though often seemingly prosaic
matters of architecture, these developments demonstrate the kind of
tinkering that reformers hope will help transform an awkward and
somewhat rebellious teen into an adult capable of carrying on
important work-to continue Professor Brower's metaphor. In the
limited space available, I will introduce, in an impressionistic way,
some of these currents, with an emphasis on textual shifts
attributable to U.S. experiences under the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").2 As it would be difficult to improve
on Brower's six issues for my purposes, I will adopt them in the
order employed by Professor Brower.

1. 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 907 (2005).

2. For more complete treatments of some of the developments touched upon
in this essay, see, e.g., Guillermo A. Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Faceof
Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (2003);
David Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the
United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 679 (2004).
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I. SUPPRESSING VEXATIOUS LITIGATION
A. VEXATIOUS FOR WHOM?
One often encounters the sentiment that direct claims-as opposed
to those selectively espoused by states on behalf of their nationalsoffer an alarming scope for foreign businesses to shift ordinary
business risks to host states, effectively turning the latter into
guarantors of business success.3 Yet, within NAFTA, the data
suggest that states have neither regularly opted for settlement, 4 norto date-suffered substantial awards.5 One reason is that especially
within NAFTA, most investor-state claims are vigorously defended
against, and most often quite expertly. Though NAFTA cases may
not be a fully representative sample, they certainly undermine any
belief that a golden parachute awaits those troubled enterprises
willing to file a claim.
Working backwards from the demonstrable success the United
States has enjoyed in defending itself against NAFTA claims, one
would not necessarily expect to encounter an insistence on reform.
Yet, the Trade Act of 2002 lists within its Principal Negotiating
Objectives the pursuit of "mechanisms to eliminate ...and to deter

the filing of frivolous claims." 6 This encumbrance on the Executive's
drafting autonomy would no doubt be propounded in substantially
similar terms by a Congress acting in 2005, though the data now
contain at least two additional U.S. "victories" before Chapter 11
tribunals,' and no awards finding the United States responsible for an
investor's troubles.
3. See Lydia Lazar, NAFTA Dispute Resolution: Secret Corporate Weapon?,
J. GLOBAL FmN. MARKETS, Winter 2000, at 49. See generally Jack J. Coe, Jr.,
Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of
Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1381 (2003).
4. See Coe, supra note 3, at 1459-60 (providing a table of the outcomes of
select arbitration cases under NAFTA, including the number of settlements,
amounts claimed, amounts recovered, and costs awarded).
5. Id.
6. Trade Act of 2002 § 2102(b)(3)(G)(i), 19 U.S.C.A. § 3802(b)(3)(G)(i)
(West 2005).
7. Not counting pending cases in which significant procedural battles have
been won by the United States, successful defenses would include ADF Group Inc.
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Two contextual points help explain why the question is not purely
one of claimant success rates. First, tribunals are not required to
award costs to respondent states that have arguably been successful;8
exercising their discretion, Chapter 11 tribunals have often declined
to do so. Second, investor-state claims occupy State Department
lawyers for years (the four-year average length with respect to
NAFTA claims against the U.S. being certain to increase after
Methanex is concluded).9
While it would not be accurate to conclude from U.S. successes in
Mondev, ° ADF1' and Loewen 12 that those claims were frivolous,
looking across the NAFTA docket affecting all three states, it must
be admitted that some claims were stronger than others. Though
some claims lapse into hibernation not long after being filed, a much
larger percentage of claimants prosecute their actions more
exhaustively. One therefore can legitimately question whether the
system is working well when states regularly endure protracted
proceedings that prove fruitless to the investor.
Certainly the arbitration process itself provides a partial apology
for the high number of losing claims. Information gathering hurdles 3
v. United States, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1 (Jan. 9, 2003),
available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/ADF/ADFFinalAward.pdf (last
visited July 29, 2005); Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, Final Award, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/99/02 (Oct. 11, 2002), 42 I.L.M. 85, available at http://nafta
claims.com/Disputes/USA/Mondev/MondevFinalAward.pdf (last visited July 29,
2005); Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Final Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/98/3 (June 26, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 811, available at http://nafta
claims.com/Disputes/USA/Loewen/LoewenFinalAward.pdf (last visited July 29,
2005). Vacatur of the latter award, however, is being sought in a federal district
court. See Loewen v. United States, Petition to Vacate, at 13, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/98/3 (Dec. 13, 2004), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
loewen-petitiontovacate.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
8. See, e.g., Arbitration (AdditionalFacilityRules), ICSID Additional Facility
Rules, sched. C, art. 58 (2003) (allocation of costs for the tribunal), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/partD.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
9. See Coe, supra note 3, at 1456, tbl. 2.
10. Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/02.
11. Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1.
12. Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3.
13. Cf Clyde Pearce & Jack J. Coe, Jr., Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter
Eleven: Some PragmaticReflections Upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico,
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 311, 315 & nn.18-21 (2000) (explaining that
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retard a shoring up of the claim's factual underpinnings (or lack
thereof), so defects in the investor's case may not become evident
until late in the process. Similarly, the mindset of many claimants is
that under a regime which promises, for example, fair and equitable
treatment, a genuine and powerful sense of having been ill-treated
ought to suffice to launch a claim, an approach perhaps encouraged
by lawyers willing to accept a contingent fee arrangement. In
addition, under NAFTA and certain other treaties, claims expire after
three years 14--a period that can easily elapse if an investor seeks
relief in domestic courts before pursuing its NAFTA avenues. There
thus may be some urgency when the investor turns to its NAFTA
options and the theories to be advanced under the treaty will not,
necessarily, be the same ones advanced in the domestic proceedings.
Still, the question remains: should there not be some mechanism by
which to jettison early in an arbitration truly misconceived claims so
that stake holders can attend to those with more merit?
B. EARLY ASSESSMENT IN GENERAL
Just as a commercial arbitration tribunal is subject to a limited
mandate, so too is one empowered under an investment treaty. For an
investor-state tribunal, the facets of jurisdiction to be observed relate
to timing of the claim, subject matter, and the character of the
disputants. Rule formulae encourage disputants to raise jurisdictional
issues promptly, and to the extent a de-linking from the merits is
possible, discrete, jurisdiction-related, questions can be briefed,
argued and decided separately-before the merits are explored.15
This practice (bifurcation) has become a fixture in arbitral practice. It
allows antecedent issues, and sometimes entire claims, to be put to
16
rest at an early juncture.
claims and theories of recovery may evolve during the pre-notice formulation of
the case).
14. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can-Mex.-U.S.,
arts. 1116-17, 32 I.L.M. 605, 643 [hereinafter NAFTA], available at http://www.
nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/indexe.aspx?DetaillD=78 (last visited July 29,
2005).
15. See John Y. Gotnanda, An Efficient Methodfor DeterminingJurisdictionin
InternationalArbitrations,40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11 (2001).
16. See, e.g., Ethyl v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction (June 24, 1998), 38
I.L.M. 708, 717-24, 730 (finding that jurisdiction existed), available at
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But exactly what kinds of competency-related questions can be
resolved before a full hearing on the merits? Some alleged problems
of jurisdiction ratione materiaeor admissibility are subtle; and some
theories of recovery, while progressive, are not wholly implausible.
Given that questions of first impression may be involved, early
guidance may assist both disputants, provided that the tribunal
retains the flexibility to allow claim amendment, so that outright
dismissal is not invariably the sanction for sponsoring an untenable
theory of recovery.
Whatever the value in being able to test claim theories early in a
proceeding, certainly a tribunal engages in a procedure at variance
with the parties' agreement if entertaining dispositive motions
expressly precluded by the treaty or governing rules. Consider,
however, the circumstance where the treaty and rules are silent. In
Methanex Corp. v. United States,17 the United States petitioned the
tribunal to declare the investor's claim not "admissible."
"Admissibility" was lacking, argued the United States, if the
claimant's submission-when taken as factually correct-failed to
describe a recognized NAFTA breach. The tribunal, however, found
no power for making such a ruling either in the NAFTA or the
UNCITRAL Rules.18
The claim testing procedure sought by the United States readily
reminds American lawyers of summary judgment and related
dispositive motions,' 9 and is a practice known in commercial
arbitration usage.20 At least one other NAFTA tribunal has
entertained such a motion more sympathetically, giving some
support to the U.S. view that it is properly a part of NAFTA
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/EthylCorp/EthylCorpAwardOnJurisdictio
n.pdf (last visited July 29, 2005); Waste Management v. Mexico, Final Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3 (Apr. 30, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 967 (determining that
an improper waiver led to dismissal), available at http://naftaclaims.com
/Disputes/Mexico/Waste/WasteFinalAwardMerits.pdf (last visited July 29, 2005).
109 (Aug. 7,
17. Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
2002), available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/Methanex
PreliminaryAwardJurisdiction.pdf (last visited July 29, 2005).
18. Id. 122-26.
19. See generally FED. R. CIv. P. 56; Id. R. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim).
20. See Michael Hoellering, Dispositive Motions in Arbitration, ADR
Summer 1996.

CURRENTS,
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practice,"1 but also demonstrating that in the absence of an express
authorization, tribunals will differ as to its availability. It is not
surprising, therefore, that a formal mechanism for testing theories of
recovery and other claim elements has been embedded in recent
treaty texts crafted by the United States, a topic to which I return
below.22
C.

VETTING MECHANISMS

Professor Park has reported elsewhere on a claim vetting
mechanism related to certain NAFTA Chapter 11 claims. 2 3 It is
limited to expropriation theories based on tax measures.2 4 Though tax
measures may be the basis of an expropriation claim, a preliminary
step is imposed:
[N]o investor may invoke [the expropriation] Article as the
basis for a claim ... where it has been determined pursuant to
this paragraph that the measure is not an expropriation. The
investor shall refer the issue of whether the measure is not an
expropriation for a determination to the appropriate
competent authorities set out in [an annex] at the time that it
gives notice [of its claim]. If the competent authorities do not
agree to consider the issue or, having agreed to consider it,
fail to agree that the measure is not an expropriation within a
period of six months after such referral, the investor may
submit its claim to arbitration under Article 1120.25
A more comprehensive vetting requirement could be easily
imagined. As recalled by Alvarez and Park, at one juncture U.S.
21. See United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction,
13, 29-37 (Nov. 22, 2002) (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arbitration), available at
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/CanadaiUPS/UPSAwardOnJurisdiction.pdf
(last
visited July 29, 2005).
22. See infra notes 59-63 and surrounding text.
23. William W. Park, NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration and the Fisc: NAFTA's
Tax Veto, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 231 (2001).
24. See, e.g., Feldman v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1
(Dec. 16, 2002), 42 I.L.M. 625 (involving a dispute over the application of certain
Mexican tax laws on the export of tobacco products made by the U.S. claimant's
company), available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Feldman/Feldman
FinalAward.pdf (last visited July 29, 2005).
25. NAFTA, supra note 14, art 2103(6).
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Senator John Kerry championed a mechanism that would have
disallowed claims deemed to be without merit by officials in the
investor's home country.2 6 Reminiscent of the traditional espousal
model,27 the procedure was among proposed amendments to the
Andean Trade Preferences Act. 2 The failure of that proposal to
prevail accords nicely with two of Professor Brower's admonitions:
first that one needs to "strike a balance between the interests of
claimants in obtaining remedies and the interests of states in
conducting public affairs without interference" and his equally
critical insight that "all systems for the adjudication of private claims
against foreign states must eliminate any role whatsoever for
political entities in the process for resolving individual claims. '"29
D. TRUSTING ARBITRATORS-IN JAPAN AND BEYOND

The tax measure procedure established under Article 2103 and that
broader regime envisioned by Senator Kerry have in common that
government officials are empowered to exclude claims before
arbitrators are seized of them. That such regimes come within the
contemplation of policy makers must speak, at least in part, to an
unwillingness to trust arbitrators to distinguish "appropriate" claims
from "unauthorized" ones. As Professor Brower reminds us,
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 30 brought

the trust issue to the fore in dramatic relief; the Supreme Court there
having to consider the extent to which international arbitration (and
international arbitrators) should be entrusted with vital market
policing doctrines.31 In a watershed decision, the Mitsubishi majority

26. Alvarez & Park, supra note 2, at 385-86 (noting that Senator Kerry's

proposed amendment to the Andean Trade Preferences Act was one of numerous
legislative efforts aimed at changing the model used in extending trade agreements

with Latin American nations).
27. See Coe, supra note 3, at 1416-18 (describing the traditional model where
states would espouse claims on behalf of their own nationals, thus depriving

private actors of standing in seeking international redress).
28. See Alvarez & Park, supra note 2, at 385.
29. Brower, supra note 1, at 913, 925.
30. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
31. Brower, supra note 1,at 907 (criticizing Justice Stevens' dissent in
Mitsubishi, which found that international arbitration should only be limited to
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professed a level of confidence that two decades later continues to
animate the largely pro-arbitration jurisprudence prevalent in
American courts, especially in relation to international disputes.
Indeed, trust it must have been that allowed that majority to accept
that three Japanese arbitrators, seated in Japan, would apply U.S.
antitrust law to a dispute between a Japanese and a Puerto Rican
corporation arising out of a contract expressly governed by Swiss
law.32
In the context of investor-state claims, the question of early
assessment allows us another opportunity to trust the arbitrators,
although not without encumbering them to an extent. As noted above
in relation to the Methanex arbitration, before the most recent
generation of investment treaties, tribunals had occasionally been
invited early in a proceeding to adjudge claims unrecognizable under
international law. The reluctance evinced by tribunals may stem from
the capacity for merits-related questions to be clad as matters of
jurisdiction. While certain jurisdictional issues might cleanly be
attended to without the risk of premature assessment, one can
sympathize with a tribunal that is careful not to abridge the
reasonably full opportunity of case presentation to which claimants
are entitled. This disinclination to truncate, genuine concern about
feckless claims, and the otherwise mixed reception dispositive
motions have received, combine to explain why the treaty correction
has been so muscular, going beyond merely clarifying the extent of
tribunal discretion. Recent accords, including the Central American
Free Trade Agreement ("CAFTA"),33 and the 2004 U.S. Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty ("BIT"),34 demonstrate. The relevant
CAFTA provision states:

contractual disputes between commercial parties and should not play a role when

the interests of nations are involved).
32. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 634 n.18, 637 n.19.
33. Central American Free Trade Agreement, May 28, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514
[hereinafter CAFTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/
BilateralJDR-CAFTA/-DRCAFTAFinalTexts/SectionIndex.html (last visited
Apr. 25, 2005).
34. 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT],
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf (last visited
July 25, 2005).
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Without prejudice to a tribunal's authority to address other
objections as a preliminary question, a tribunal shall address
and decide as a preliminary question any objection by the
respondent that, as a matter of law, a claim submitted is not a
claim for which an award in favor of the claimant may be
made .... 35
Somewhat elaborate further provisions establish a procedural
framework for the handling of the respondent's motion, with
particular reference to its timing, the schedule for deciding it36 and
the manner of framing the dispositive question. 37 The procedure calls
for a reasoned, legal analysis, not a factual one. The failure as a
matter of law test would seem broad enough to include flaws related
to timing (pre-treaty breaches and time bars), the disputants (e.g.,
nationality), and substantive cognizability. The respondent state need
not invoke the procedure, 38 but where it does, the tribunal appears to
not have discretion to decline the request.3 9 When requested,
however, the tribunal should be entitled to conclude after hearing the
parties that an interdependence among issues or similar reason
precludes a decision at that juncture.

35. CAFTA, supra note 33, art. 28.
36. See id. arts. 10.20(4)(a)-(b) (establishing that a respondent submits an
objection as soon as possible after the tribunal forms, and generally not after
respondent's counter memorial; and the tribunal decides to suspend the
proceedings on the merits, schedule and decide any objections). The Tribunal must
also expedite the process if the respondent so requests, subject to certain
qualifications. Id. art. 10.20(5).
37. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 34. Article 28(c) states: "The tribunal shall
assume to be true claimant's factual allegations in support of any claim in the
[T]he tribunal may also
notice of arbitration (or any amendment thereof) ....
consider any relevant facts not in dispute."
38. Id. art. 28(d) (noting that the respondent does not waive any objection as to
competence or any argument on the merits merely by not raising an objection
under this paragraph, nor must an expedited procedure be used).
39. In invoking the procedure, the respondent state risks becoming liable for
the investor's associated costs however. See id. art. 10.20(6). If, however, the
respondent is successful, the claimant may have to bear the respondent's costs. Id.

20051

STATE OFINVESTOR-STA TE ARBITRATION

II. THE LEVEL OF DISCRETION GRANTED TO
ADJUDICATORS
A. IN GENERAL

A number of elements, some emergent and some time-honored,
constrain tribunals from utterly fanciful dispositions of claims. All
are linked in some fashion to express textual guidance informing the
process, though few would argue that alone they fully prevent
tribunal misadventure. These constraints include that tribunals must
in general apply the law, and are subject to external system features
that may activate internal modes of moderation and self-restraint.
B. DUTY TO APPLY THE LAW '
NAFTA instructs a Chapter 11 tribunal to apply the text of the
NAFTA and "applicable rules of international law. ' 40 The respective
rule formulae relevant to Chapter 11 in turn prohibit, without the
parties' consent, awards ex aequo et bono (a quasi-legislative
exercise in which the tribunal tailors the outcome to the equities
involved, instead of strictly applying rules of law). 4' A new entrant to
the field may assume that these two instructions limit tribunal
discretion to a substantial degree. After all, is not the tribunal left
only to consult the treaty and applicable customary rule? The reality
is that public international law remains fragmentary, and its sources
decentralized in large measure. Declarations of non liquet not being
an option, 42 relatively high levels of adjudicatory invention,

40. NAFTA, supra note 14, art. 1131.
41. See generally Christoph Schreuer, Decisions Ex Aequo of Boro Under the
ICSID Convention, 11 ICSID Rev. - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 37 (1996); Louis B. Sohn,
Arbitration of International Disputes Ex Aequo Et Bono, in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 330 (1967).
42. Article 42 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States ("ICSID Convention") precludes
findings of non liquet-that is, it may not declare its inability to rule "on the ground
of silence or obscurity of the law." Mar. 18, 1965, art. 42, 17 U.S.T. 1270.
However, neither the corresponding Arbitration Rules nor the Additional Facility
Rules express the same prohibition.
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synthesis, and progressiveness may be called for.43 That is not to say
that arbitrators have carte blanche; rather it is that the broad doctrines
which describe host state undertakings are simply not supported by a
detailed and refined customary undergirding. Instead, one discovers
what one can from the "general and consistent practice of states
[followed] from a sense of legal obligation" 44 and copes with
abstractions like "fair and equitable treatment" in the time-honored
manner. For some, of course, the exercise appears nearly
indistinguishable from ex aequo et bono proceedings.
C. MECHANISMS AND INFLUENCES INTERNAL TO THE TRIBUNAL

Three-arbitrator tribunals are typical in investor-state arbitration.
Intra-tribunal dynamics of course vary from tribunal to tribunal, but
the fact of reasoned awards, the permissibility of separate and
dissenting opinions,"5 the availability of courts to publicly entertain
set aside actions, and a preference among tribunals for unanimity"6
may combine in various ways to produce a carefully composed
award that avoids extremes. Under some investment treaties of the
United States, moreover, one finds an opportunity for the disputants
and the non-disputing treaty partner to comment "concerning any
aspect" of the draft award, which is to be circulated to them by the
tribunal.

7

43. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 70-104 (1973) (regarding 'lacunae' in international
law and the adjudicator's function).

44. As the U.S. Model BIT defines "customary international law." U.S. Model
BIT, supra note 34, Annex A.
45. See generally Richard M. Mosk & Tom Ginsburg, Dissenting Opinions in
International Arbitration, in LIBER AMICORUM BENGT BROMS 259 (Matt
Tupamiiki ed., 1999).

46. My support for the tendency among arbitrators to prefer unanimity is
anecdotal, but manifold. Cf David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware
Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REv. 127, 129 (1997) (discussing the high incidence of
unanimity despite numerous divisive issues).

47. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, Oct. 25, 2004, U.S.-Uru., art. 9(a) [hereinafter U.S.-Uru. BIT],
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/WorldRegions/Americas/SouthAmerica

/UruguayBIT/asset_uploadfile583_6728.pdf (last visited July 11, 2005). The
plaintiffs bar may regard this as just another avenue for the state parties to press for
a mutually preferred interpretation at the expense of the investor. But the
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That investment awards are more quickly becoming public may
also play a moderating role, in perhaps two ways. First, the
availability of other awards potentially addressing the same treaty
48
provision promotes informal, indirect consultation among tribunals.
Second, given that the work of investor-state arbitrators will remain
available for generations of specialists to explore and critique,
49
especial care may be applied in the drafting and reasoning process.
D. TEXTUAL CONSTRAINTS

1. In General
The natural inclination of states to counter the risk of unexpected
invention is evident in two aspects of the control they exercise over
governing texts. First, there are explicitly reserved powers of
"interpretation" and unilateral comment. Second, states refine the
manner in which protections are described. Thus far, both techniques
have been used to confine the class of claims that might otherwise be
brought, rather than to enlarge them.
2. Interpretive Notes and Non-DisputantComment
As has been much discussed,50 NAFTA allows the three states to
jointly issue-subsequent to that treaty coming into force-notes of
interpretation that bind Chapter 11 tribunals. 1 The same prerogative
opportunity to comment is available equally to both sides; the exercise may in a

given case prevent post-award maneuvering of the type seen, for example, in
Metalclad and Loewen, because once alerted to a potential weakness, the tribunal
may apply a cure.
48. Cf Martin J. Hunter, Publication of Arbitration Awards and Lex
Mercatoria, 54 ARB. 55 (1988) (published awards of the Iran-U.S. Tribunal of
great value to practitioners and students).
49. The shift toward ready availability of investor-state awards and decisions
has been precipitous, and corresponds to the burgeoning attentiveness of new
sectors of stakeholders. Thus, it seems unlikely that in August 2000, the Metalclad
tribunal expected its award to ultimately appear in several casebooks and to be
discussed in many dozens of articles and similar commentaries. Equally, were that
tribunal to be composing its award today, it would likely fully expect such
attention.
50. See Charles H. Brower, II, Structure,Legitimacy, and NAFTA 's Investment
Chapter,36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 78-86 (2002).
51. See NAFTA, supra note 14, art. 1131.
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has been included in subsequent investment treaties of the United
States.52 Under NAFTA, two such Notes have been issued. Though
both addressed aspects of process transparency-itself a matter of
abiding interest-the first Note also sets forth a meaning for Article
1105 more modest and less protective of investors than some
tribunals had given it. Shorn of certain niceties, the Note affirmed
that the phrase "fair and equitable treatment" was a reference to the
international minimum standard, or components of it, rather than
establishing an autonomous treaty standard. 53 As Professor Brower
elsewhere has exposed with skill and conviction, the right to interpret
can be exercised in troubling and disruptive ways. 54 Nevertheless, for
better or worse, the mechanism holds the potential to unify
expectations and discourage ipse dixit awards.55
Less formally binding than interpretations, but potentially
influential nevertheless, are the interpretive submissions nondisputant treaty parties are entitled unilaterally to make in the context
of an ongoing proceeding. Part of the NAFTA architecture 56 and
found in certain other BITs,5 7 the mechanism gives an obvious
stakeholder an opportunity to inform the process. The views taken
need not accord with those advanced by the disputant state, and thus
in theory are- able to expose untenable positions by either disputant,
or indeed to depart from the positions of both disputants. 8

52. See, e.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 34, arts. 30(3), 31.
53. See Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment

Law 23 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. Working Paper on International
Investment No. 2004/3, Sept. 2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
54. Some commentators, including Professor Brower, have questioned at what
point an Interpretive Note might become a de facto treaty amendment effected
without the benefit of the normally applicable internal processes and safeguards.
See Brower, supra note 50, at 78-86. See generally Todd Weiler, NAFTA
Investment Law in 2001: As the Legal Order Starts to Settle, the Bureaucrats
Strike Back, 36 INT'L LAW. 345 (2002).

55. See Coe, supra note 3, at 1429-30.
56. See NAFTA, supra note 14, art. 1128.

57. See Agreement Between Japan and the United Mexican States for the
Strengthening of the Economic Partnership, art. 86, available at http://www.
mofa.go.jp/region/latin/mexico/agreement (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
58. See Pearce & Coe, supra note 13, 337 & nn.96-97.
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3. Textual Hedging
Several U.S. sponsored treaty texts have included analytical guides
not found, for example, in the NAFTA, nor in BITs of an earlier
dispensation. For example, no doubt with cases like Methanex in
mind, the Singapore-U.S. Fair Trade Agreement ("FTA") by an
exchange of letters creates a presumption against regulatory takings:
"Except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions
by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations."5 9
Again we encounter Professor Brower's theme of systemic
balance between investors' legitimately pursued remedies and the
vital operations of states. Whether this textual attempt to subdue
regulatory taking claims without precluding them outright strikes the
correct balance will no doubt continue to be debated. Certainly, the
"[e]xcept in rare circumstances" proviso leaves little room for
recovery. The enumerated list of public objectives-health, safety,
and the environment-is broad and phrased to illustrate, rather than
to exhaust. 60 The discouragement this broad rebuff should generate
may repel a much larger class of claims than one might have
imagined.
Yet, the tribunal has the authority to award compensation in
unusual circumstances; the silence as to what kinds of circumstances
engage the host state's responsibility is bound to produce argument
in most cases. Similarly, the qualification that the regulation be
"designed and applied" to protect "legitimate objectives" invites

59. See Letter from Robert B. Zoellick, United States Trade Representative,
Government of the United States, to George Yeo, Minister for Trade and Industry,
Government of Singapore, and accompanying confirmation of receipt (May 6,
2003),
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/
SingaporeFTA/SectionIndex.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2005); Free Trade
Agreement, June 6, 2003, U.S.-Chile, Annex 10-D, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral!ChileFTA/FinalTexts/as
set_upload_filel_4004.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2005); U.S. Model BIT, supra
note 34, Annex B (all containing parallel provisions); see also Gantz, supra note 2,
at 728, 745-46 (examining the changes in the Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
with respect to expropriation).
60. I infer this from the "such as" structure used.
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consideration of what might be termed "proportionality," 61 both as to
the breadth of the regulation and the manner in which authorities
administer the law. Questioning what objectives are "legitimate" of
course only begins the argument. Notwithstanding a legitimate
objective, a facially unobjectionable regulatory regime may serve as
cover for arbitrary official acts and over-reaching, such that the
original objective is beside the point. Similarly, a clumsy or poorly
grounded attempt at regulation 62 may produce a regime gravely
disproportionate in its impact on the foreign investor in light of the
evil to be addressed and the nature of the alternatives available to
lawmakers.63

III. THE ENTITLEMENT OF STATES TO CLAIM
THE BENEFIT OF ALL DOUBT IN CLOSE CASES
Professor Brower's suggestion that we consider a to-the-sovereign
benefit of doubt solution in close cases is both rich with possibilities
and also a bit unsettling. If what is being proposed is a rigorous
application of existing principles of substance and procedure related
to claimant's burden, that much states are entitled to expect. Care is
warranted, however, to prevent an unruly if convenient
presupposition that might combine with the pro-state embroidery
increasingly to be found in U.S. texts to discourage all but the
boldest aggrieved investor. Legal systems certainly need tie-breaking
rules; the question that arises, however, is whether the burden the
61. The matching of means to ends to which "proportionality" speaks has been
explored by the European Court of Human Rights and by at least one tribunal
adjudicating an investor-state dispute under a BIT. See Jack J. Coe, Jr. & Noah
Rubins, Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case: Context and
Contributions,in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING
THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 597, 624, 653-56 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005).
CASES FROM

CUSTOMARY

62. Consider the well-meaning State that in an abundance of caution reacts to
unsubstantiated scientific theories supporting the specter of harm. If the investor
can prove them to have been completely unfounded, may it recover for its now
defunct investment?
63. See James & Others v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 14, 3234 (1986) (analyzing the legitimacy of a law designed to eliminate social injustices
to leaseholders), available at http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1986/2.html
(last visited Apr. 25, 2005); CLARE OVEY & ROBIN WHITE, JACOBS & WHITE, THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 309-19 (3d ed. 2002).
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claimant already ought to have-as to alleged facts and the content
of applicable law-does not speak to most of the close cases that
Professor Brower has in mind. Regardless, one arguably finds some
evidence that a pro-sovereign default operates at present, at least
among some arbitrators. NAFTA examples might include the
Loewen tribunal's treatment of the continuous nationality and
exhaustion principles. 6' Then there is dicta, such as that found in S.D.
Myers, Inc. v. Canada,that foreshadows what came to represent U.S.
bilateral negotiating policy. The S.D. Myers majority wrote: "The
general body of precedent usually does not treat regulatory action as
amounting to expropriation. Regulatory conduct by public authorities
is unlikely to be the subject of legitimate complaint under [the
NAFTA's expropriation provision], although the tribunal does not
rule out that possibility. 65
As I understand Professor Brower, he did not propose anything
radical, but rather something routine. He does succeed in promoting
further thinking about defaults and expectations in close cases. So
too did his invocation of Mr. Fortier's arresting choice of titles"Caveat Investor"-hint at the potential importance of claimant
expectations as a factor in assessing state responsibility. Mr. Fortier
was commenting in part on the lack of precision in the law of taking,
and the need for correspondingly realistic expectations. A somewhat
different role for expectations is being encouraged in U.S. treaty
texts. Borrowing phrasing found in U.S. Supreme Court cases, and
later in U.S. argument before NAFTA tribunals, recent U.S.
investment treaties ask arbitrators in assessing indirect expropriation
claims to consider an investor's "reasonable investment-backed
expectations" in relation to the property interference suffered.66
64. See Jack J. Coe, Jr., The Mandate of Chapter11 Tribunals Jurisdictionand
Related Questions, in NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: PAST ISSUES
CURRENT PRACTICE, FUTURE PROSPECTS

215, 240-41 (Todd Weiler ed., 2004).

65. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, First Partial Award, 281 (Nov. 13, 2000), 40
112, ICSID
I.L.M. 1408 (award on liability); cf Feldman v. Mexico, Award,
Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1 (Dec. 16, 2002), 42 I.L.M. 625 (paraphrasing with
approval Azinian v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2 (Nov. 1, 1999), 39
I.L.M. 537, stating that not all regulatory activity that makes the investment
uneconomical is an expropriation).
66. See, e.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 34, Annex B. One can expect
respondent states to argue-not unlike the United States did in Methanex-that the
type of government interference complained of would have been within the
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IV. THE ADOPTION OF MECHANISMS TO
PROMOTE UNIFORMITY OF DECISION
A. IN GENERAL
1. The Evil to Be Mitigated
Whether one blames a general indeterminacy in rules of decision
or the variant proclivities of arbitrators, unfortunate results flow from
disarray in the jurisprudence applicable to host state undertakings, at
least in extreme cases of disunity. Whereas ill-advised but well
understood rules produce an unsatisfactory situation in other ways,
when rule content is (or is perceived to be) largely a subjective
matter, claimants may be induced to pursue fanciful theories of
recovery, or to abandon plausible ones, while correspondingly, host
states may be forced to defend-perhaps unsuccessfully--claims that
ought not to have been brought, while escaping rigor in cases in
which they might properly have been made to account. The "crapshoot" flavor of the exercise, in turn, leaves disputants poorer but
dissatisfied, supplies ample ammunition to arbitration's many
detractors, and makes for great inefficiency.
2. Sources of Disunity
A number of factors at present promote a measure of disharmony
among investor-state awards--certainly in their respective analyses
of doctrine, and perhaps to a meaningful extent also in their
outcomes (a wholly different question). First, composition and legal
training vary among tribunals. It would be naive to assume that these
factors are without influence, though one is left with anecdotes, not
data, in pursuing the point.6 7
contemplation of a reasonable investor similarly situated, so that the claimant must
be deemed to have accepted the regulatory risk that ultimately materialized.
67. Professor Brower's clever juxtaposing of Metalclad and Loewen, and the
disparate views of the process they conjure, is the kind of comparison that spurs
one on in this inquiry. The diversity in backgrounds of arbitrators cannot but have
an impact on the manner in which doctrines of public international law are
explored. Though I am not confident that any causal pattern can be isolated, it is
nevertheless fascinating that among Chapter 11 arbitrators, for instance, some
arbitrators qualify as genuine public international law specialists, some have
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Additionally, bilateral treaty texts, while remarkably similar, do
vary inter se as a natural consequence of having different drafters,
with sometimes different priorities and accustomed to different legal
cultures and style preferences. Tribunals vary in the degree to which
treaty texts control the analysis, but some arbitrators may draw
inferences from these textual differences, noting for example the
presence or absence of a provision in the treaty under examination in
comparison to another familiar to the tribunal.68
The problem of divergent rules can be overstated of course.
International law specialists, accustomed to the decentralized sources
upon which the system depends, tolerate a measure of indeterminacy,
and understand that a process in which a margin of flexibility
operates is preferable to rigid, if-then approaches to complex fact
patterns that occur in nearly endless variety. In assessing the
acuteness of the problem, moreover, we academics may be especially
prone to overlook a pattern of plausible results while myopically
dissecting award methodology and dictum. While reasons matter,
and dictum often resurfaces in mischievous ways, the system is one
in which stare decisis does not formally operate, arbitrators are
fiercely independent, academics are vigilant, and counsel are
sophisticated. Consequently, dubious pronouncements of law and
construction may lose currency rather rapidly.
Still, until the community of authorities has canonized some rules
and discredited others, there may be justification in longing for a
second opinion in relation to the exact role of the exhaustion of local
remedies doctrine 69 and the continuous nationality principle under
primarily international trade backgrounds, some are commercial law generalists
known for their expertise in international arbitration, and some have held high
judicial posts. A category denominated "none of the above" also has occupants.
Superimposed on these differences, of course, are variations among civil law and
common law methodologies that make international arbitral procedure dynamic
and intriguing. Doubtless, the same textual techniques mentioned in connection
with arbitral discretion-interpretive notes and presumptive guides-also naturally
promote a shared sense of content, notwithstanding background variables. Such
formal guidance notwithstanding, skillful, learned arbitrators exercising utmost

intellectual honesty may hold to different interpretations of a common treaty
provision because of the other determinants they bring to the exercise.
68. See Coe & Rubins, supra note 61.
69. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Waiver and Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule
in NAFTA Jurisprudence,in NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION; PAST
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Chapter 11,70 the going concern rule as applied to a two-year old
enterprise,7 1 the application of rules of attribution in investment
arbitration 72 and numerous other pivotal questions regularly
confronting arbitrators in investor-state cases. In addition, not all

misadventure is of a temporary nature. As Professor Park has
highlighted elsewhere, for example, the manifest disregard
doctrine-fully discredited within academia-has enjoyed surprising
longevity in U.S. courts.7 3 In an interesting development, that
doctrine, in addition to the statutory grounds,74 is being relied upon
by the unsuccessful claimant in the Loewen arbitration, who now
seeks vacatur in a D.C. court.75

ISSUES, CURRENT PRACTICE, FUTURE PROSPECTS 253, 280-86 (Todd Weiler ed.,

2004) (explaining how questions remain after, and because of, Loewen).
70. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/98/3 (June 26, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 811, availableat http://naftaclaims.com/
Disputes/USA/Loewen/LoewenFinalAward.pdf (last visited July 29, 2005). See
generally Matthew S. Duchesne, The Continuous Nationality of Claims Principle:
Its Historical Development and Current Relevance to Investor-State Investment
Disputes, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L. L. REv. 783 (2004).
71. Cf Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v. United Mexican States,
186, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2 (May 29, 2003) (finding, in part, that two
years of profitable operations remained insufficient to warrant DCF method given
other elements of uncertainty).
72. Cf CME Czech Rep. B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award,
318, 58384 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib., Sept. 13, 2001), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca
/documents/CME-200lPartialAward.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2005); Lauder v.
Czech Republic, Final Award,
246-47, 308 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib., Sept. 3,
2004) (holding that liability cannot stem from the actions of persons who cannot be
attributable to the State because such an attribution would equate to holding the
State strictly liable for private actions of its officials), available at
http://www2004.mfcr.cz/static/Arbitraz/en/FinalAward.doc (last visited July 18,
2005).
73. William W. Park, Saving the FAA 4(2), INT'L ARB. NEWS, Summer 2004,
at 10.
74. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) (amended 2002).
75. See Loewen v. United States, Petition to Vacate, at 13, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/98/3 (Dec. 13, 2004), available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/JSA
/Loewen/Loewen%20-%20JR%20-%20Petition%20to%20Vacate%20-%2025-0205.pdf (last visited July 29, 2005).
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B. NON-AD Hoc BODIES
1. FirstInstance Tribunals
Calls for an appellate mechanism to some extent take for granted
the ad hoc nature of the first tier award givers. No standing body with
fixed panelists serves. Rather, arbitrators designated for the particular
dispute in question and representing diverse backgrounds adjudicate
the matter while typically holding other permanent posts as lawyers,
academics or judges. There are, of course, some repeat players and
familiar names, and as a proxy for an ordered system of precedent,
the ready availability of the reasoned awards of other tribunals no
doubt prevents total insularity. Nevertheless, there remains no formal
structure for developing and maintaining institutional learning in
matters of substance. Nor is there a formal mechanism for reposing
that learning in adjudicators whose terms of office would allow them
to develop specialized knowledge and expertise and who would
serve in a regularized rotation (and some would say, with higher
levels of accountability than under the present regime).
2. Appellate Bodies
Given that no standing panel serves in the first instance, is there
not some organ empowered to offer recourse to dissatisfied
disputants, or to receive interim requests for advisory opinions so as
to prevent the first instance arbitrators from going terribly off
course? We, after all, find such entities (albeit with different
mandates) in the WTO system and in the EU. For the uninitiated, the
answer with respect to NAFTA may come as a surprise, especially
given its many institutions and subsidiary organs: recourse must be
had to the domestic courts of the locale deemed to be the "place" of
arbitration, where domestic trial court judges will apply local
arbitration law, which may vary across borders and from legal unit to
76
legal unit (e.g., from province to province).
That the existing structure can only go so far to promote unity of
decision becomes apparent when one again considers the Chapter 11
76. See generally Jack J. Coe, Jr., Domestic Court Control of Investment
Awards: Necessary Evil or Achilles Heel Within NAFTA and the ProposedFTAA?,
19 J. INT'L ARB. 185 (2002).
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architecture. Absent further ICSID Convention ratifications (and
hence the possibility of resort to ICSID's ad hoc Committee
system), 7 a single domestic trial judge, applying local law, considers
requests for a set aside (vacatur). That judge will ordinarily have far
less experience with international law and arbitration doctrine than
the three arbitrators who rendered-typically by unanimous
determination-the award. Moreover, that judge is not empowered
under local law to review the merits of the award, so that any
unification in the substantive law that results will be indirect at best.
Indeed, should a local judge stray into the merits, open criticism may
follow.78
3. Supra-NationalAppellate Bodies
Replacing the customary disputant-appointed first instance
tribunals with a standing body has not been seriously considered,
perhaps because the disputants' ability to designate arbitrators to
match the case remains in the perceptions of stakeholders an
important exercise of party autonomy. The need for an appellate
mechanism has by contrast been much discussed, in part because the
WTO has provided the relevant communities with an example of
how such an organ might function. 9 As Professor Brower has
observed elsewhere, such a systemic change, properly implemented,
could appreciably enhance legitimacy.80 Sharing this belief, U.S.
policy has recently adopted the concept, as evident in the abovementioned Trade Negotiating Objectives. They include: "providing
for an appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to

77. See generally Andrea Giardina, ICSID: A Self-Contained, Non-National
Review System, in INTERNATIONALARBITRATION IN THE21 ST CENTURY: TOWARDS
"JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY? 199 (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N.

Brower eds., 1994).
78. Todd Weiler, Metalclad v. Mexico: A Play in Three Parts, available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Papers/JWI%2OArticle%2OFinal.pdf (last visited Apr.

25, 2005).
79. For discussion of the WTO Appellate Body, see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 166-71 (2002).
80. See Brower, supra note 50, at 66-68, 91-92; see also William S. Dodge,
InternationalDecision: Metalcad Corp. v. Mexico, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 910, 918

(2001) (advocating the creation of an appellate body to correct errors of law).
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81
the interpretations of investment provisions in trade agreements.
Under these instructions, the United States has agreed respectively
with Singapore, Chile and its CAFTA counterparts that by dates
certain, establishment of an appellate mechanism will at least be
given consideration.8 2 Even in the best of circumstances, numerous
subsidiary questions of architecture naturally arise in constructing
such a body.83 Not least among such issues, given its contemporary
prominence, is what role ICSID will play.84
It seems clear given the Objectives' emphasis on achieving
interpretive coherence that a measure of substantive review is
contemplated, leading to a de-emphasis on finality in favor of
jurisprudential refinement and predictability. This characteristic, if
implemented, will distinguish the investor-state review process from
that prevalent in international commercial arbitration, where the
decided trend in recent decades has been away from consideration of
the merits of an award.85 For governments (or at least for lawmakers
sensitive to public perceptions), unpredictability is too costly to be
tolerated, costly not only in terms of resources but also in terms of
public confidence and a heightened potential for backlash against
arbitration.

81. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 § 2102(b), 19 U.S.C.A. § 3802(b)
(West 2005); see also Barton Legum, The Introduction of an Appellate
Mechanism: The U.S. Trade Act of 2002, in ANNULMENT OF ICSID AWARDS 289
(Emannuel Gaillard ed., 2004).
82. See Gantz, supra note 2, at 762 (explaining that desirability is obvious, but
a mutually agreeable mechanism may be difficult to achieve).
83. 1 list some of these and related considerations in Coe, supra note 3, at
1446-53, and others, more briefly, in Coe, supra note 76, at 206-07; see also
Legum, supra note 81.
84. See Possible Improvements of the Frameworkfor ICSID Arbitration 1
20-23, Annex (ICSID Discussion Paper, Oct. 2004) (outlining ICSID's possible

role in operating an appellate mechanism and discussing other issues raised by
evolving treaty texts and government policies), available at http://www.
worldbank.org/icsid/improve-arb.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
85. See KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 724-

25 (1993) (providing tables that indicate, inter alia, the grounds for recourse under
UNCITRAL and specific countries).
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V. THE REJECTION OF POST-JUDGMENT
PROCEEDINGS THAT CONSISTENTLY THREATEN
TO ROB CLAIMANTS OF THEIR VICTORIES
Professor Brower's no doubt careful choice of words-"to rob"conveys the lack of fairness that may characterize the process and
result. For better or worse, absent further ICSID Convention
ratifications, any robbing that occurs under Chapter 11 will be
carried out in domestic courts, at present the sole means of recourse
against a Chapter 11 award. But would one have predicted in 1994
that Canadian courts would play the seminal role? If one counts the
recent appellate level processing of the Feldman award,86 Canadian
courts have functioned in this capacity four times, each time at the
behest of a respondent state seeking set aside. Until recently, they
7
were alone in being so seized.1
Doubtless, ever the respondents, the NAFTA triad have legitimate
reasons to resist precedent likely to encourage further claims, to chill
otherwise desirable regulatory activity, and to confer seeming
advantages on foreign enterprise in comparison to domestic
investors. As in most things, however, it is a question of avoiding the
extremes. Finality is in itself an interstate value to be pursued (even
at the occasional cost of allowing an arguable award to stand). In a
setting in which expertise inversion operates, and merits review is in
theory not part of the court's mandate, the presumption against set
aside ought to be all the greater. Among the reasons to empanel three
arbitrators (at an appreciable additional cost) and to allow each party
to select an arbitrator and to have joint input in the designation of a

86. Feldman v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/I (Dec. 16,
2002), 42 I.L.M. 625, available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/
Feldman/FeldmanFinalAward.pdf (last visited July 29, 2005).
87. The recently filed vacatur action by Raymond Loewen is a departure in two

ways: first, it is the investor seeking vacatur; second, it is an American court that
will process the action. See Loewen v. United States, Petition to Vacate, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (Dec. 13, 2004), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca
/documents/loewen-petitiontovacate.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2005). The Canadian
actions in each case applied a version of the Model law. The Loewen proceeding
will likely fall under the FAA, and the petition makes that assumption. Id. at 5; see
also Feldman, Award, § 8 n.15, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1 (dissenting
opinion).
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chair, are to ensure balance, expertise, and thoroughness in the
adjudication of the claim.
Although Justice Tysoe's partial set aside of the unanimous
Metalclad award met with considerable disapproval in specialist
circles,88 there is good news. Canadian courts have not allowed
Metalclad to prefigure further eleventh hour re-adjudications of
investor state claims. Subsequent reviews of awards seem to have
reverted to the spirit of earlier Canadian authority89 and of the Model
Law90 on which Canadian statutes are based-influences
unconvincingly resisted by Justice Tysoe. The latest in the hopeinspiring post-Metalclad string of cases-the appeal in Feldmanwas decided in January of this year. Two arbitrators-the majorityhad found discrimination in the handling of certain tax rebates and
thus violation of the national treatment principle. Having
unsuccessfully sought set aside in the lower Ontario court, Mexico
pursued appeal. In addition to declining to re-adjudicate the
tribunal's findings of fact in critical respects, a unanimous appeals

88. Chief among critical commentators was Professor Brower, whose article
generated an informative and lively exchange with Mexico's lead counsel. Charles
H. Brower, II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 43 (2001); J.C. Thomas, A Reply to Professor Brower,
40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 433 (2002); Charles H. Brower, II, Beware the
Jabberwock: A Reply to Mr. Thomas, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 465 (2002).
Though aberrant, even Justice Tysoe's decision may have positive attributes.
Whatever the benefits of minimalist drafting in the private international award
setting, Metalclad underscores the perils of economically presented reasons in
cases with vast implications for sovereign states. To the extent Justice Tysoe's
decision encourages more detailed compositions, it promotes maximally helpful
precedent more ready for a system now characterized by luxurious levels of
transparency and heightened stakeholder attentiveness.
89. See Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp., [1990] B.C.L.R.2d 207
(B.C. App.) (level of intervention should reflect self-restraint). See generally Jack
J. Coe, Jr., Metalclad - A Retrospective, NAFTA ARB. REP. 65 (2002).
90. See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (June 21, 1985),
24 I.L.M. 1302 (court not to intervene except as provided herein); id. art. 34 (errors
of law not listed as set aside ground); cf William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in
InternationalArbitration, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 805, 816-18 (1999) (distinguishing
models of scrutiny that allow consideration of the substantive merits from those
that limit review to procedural fairness, but noting that even the former may leave
the "overzealous judge" "wiggle room" to examine a dispute's merits under the
banner of testing for arbitrator excess of authority).
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court approached in moderate tones the potentially most elastic of the
set aside grounds-public policy:
The concept of imposing our public policy on foreign awards
is to guard against enforcement of an award which offends
our local principles of justice and fairness in a fundamental
way, and in a way which the parties could attribute to the fact
that the award was made in another jurisdiction where
procedural or substantive rules diverge markedly from our
own, or where there was ignorance or corruption on the part
of the tribunal which could not be seen to be tolerated or
condoned by our courts. 9
The court ultimately concluded that nothing in the award rendered
it fundamentally unjust or unfair and that it was rationally connected
to the discriminatory conduct found to have occurred by the tribunal.
That the claimant in the arbitration was alleged to have relied on
fictitious transactions was an allegation the effect of which "was for
the tribunal to decide. ' 92 In the manner and tone of the decision, and
in the deference shown to arbitrators, it appears we have come full
circle back to Mitsubishi, itself a case in which public policy was
deeply involved. 93
66(2) (Ont.
91. United Mexican States v. Karpa, [2005] CarswellOnt 32,
App.) (quoting Corporacion Transnacional de Inversiones S.A. de C.V. v. STET
2-3 (Ont. App.), which cited with
International S.p.A., [2000] 49 O.R.3d 414,
approval, Schreter v. Gasmac Inc., [1992] 7 O.R.3d 608, 623 (Ont. Gen. Div.)).
92. Id. 68.
93. In Mitsubishi, the majority had to trust arbitrators in the first instance with
subject matter thought in an earlier time to be nonarbitrable on public policy
grounds. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
638 (1985). Interestingly, public policy was concurrently relied on by the Court in
an attempt to assuage fears that U.S. antitrust law would be emasculated in the
hands of international arbitrators: "[I]n the event the choice-of-forum and choiceof-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to
pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in
condemning the agreement as against public policy." Id. at 637 n.19. In the case at
hand, Mitsubishi had conceded that the antitrust claims were governed by
American law and that they had been presented to the tribunal on that basis. Id. at
638. The Court's intriguing observation on the control function of public policy
leaves one to question how-functionally-public policy would be vindicated in
the 'prospective waiver' scenario envisioned by the Court. The public policy
refusal ground under the New York Convention would be available only if the
award was submitted to a U.S. court for enforcement (not a forgone conclusion
given the Convention's large number of adherent states). If the public policy was
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VI. THE ELIMINATION OF ANY ROLE FOR
POLITICAL ENTITIES IN THE DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS
The late Ibrahim Shihata, then Secretary General of ICSID,
described that institution's fundamental objective as being to
"depoliticize" the resolution of investment disputes by affording both
states and investors access to a truly neutral forum and precluding
the investors' countries from intervening meanwhile.94 We have
certainly come a long way from an era in which the political
influences sought to be neutralized by investment treaties were raw
and aggressive. 95 Though the doctrine of diplomatic protection still
operates, it is manifest in claim espousal rather than threats of armed
attack. It has, moreover, largely been supplanted by the direct claim
mechanisms that are now standard features of BITs, shifting the
approach to one that depends on legal rules of decision and the
placing of strategic control with the disputants whose rights are
directly in question.96 With the failure-at least in the short term--of
initiatives that would have established home-state screening of
claims, the cardinal risk of undue government interference resides in
the interpretive note feature initiated in NAFTA Chapter 11 and
found in successor texts.
to affect enforcement of the clause, one wonders how a court was to know at that
early juncture that a prospective waiver was in the works. Questions of this
order-now much discussed-and fresh ones of the kind Professor Brower has
found, confirm Mitsubishi's evergreen character. For contemporaneous comment,
see Thomas E. Carbonneau, The ExuberantPathway to Quixotic Internationalism:
Assessing the Folly of Mitsubishi, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263 (1986);

William W. Park, Private Adjudicators and the Public Interest: The Expanding
Scope ofInternationalArbitration, 12 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 629 (1986).
94. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment
Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID Rev. - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1, 4
(1986).
95. The 1861 invasion of Mexico by France over the former's non-payment of
a private loan was an extreme case of "diplomatic protection" of the type that
brought the doctrine into disrepute. Id. at 1n. 1.
96. In the last decade, the WTO, of course, has moved away from the
diplomatic model to a system guided by a growing body of jurisprudence. See
James Cameron & Kevin R. Gray, Principles of International Law in the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 248 (2001). It, of course, remains
a mechanism characterized by state-to-state adjudication, whereas the present
investor-state model allows for direct private claims. Id. at 292-93.
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While the potential for undisciplined use of interpretive powers is
obvious, those powers are likely to be moderated by the requirement
of unanimity and the dual role each state plays as host and home to
investors. Overreaching that protects the United States as respondent
may hurt its investors in their operations abroad. Further, tribunals
retain, in many respects, the last word. As NAFTA teaches, states
might tether text to custom, but retain only limited power to ensure
that the custom to be consulted is that of a bygone era.9 7

CONCLUSION
Much remains to be seen. A mix of procedural and substantive
refinements is producing an investor-state claims apparatus that will
be tested in an environment of unprecedented transparency, and
perhaps equally unprecedented attentiveness on the parts of the
academic and legal community. For states, the adjustments that have
been made may represent the return to sensible principles of which
Professor Brower speaks. For the claimant's lawyer, by contrast, it
may seem that the movement generated has been entirely in the
direction of protecting states. Yet, ultimately, it is states that confer
arbitral rights en masse. If recalibrations of the kind currently
underway are the price of forestalling more reactionary initiatives,
they may be worth any marginal ground claimants lose along the
way.98 Regardless, neither new investments nor new claim filings are
likely to abate anytime soon.
97. In fairness to the NAFTA governments, none seems to have argued as a
final position that the custom to which NAFTA Article 1105 is said to implicitly
refer is that which existed in the 1920's. In its clarified submission, however,
Mexico seems to have come the closest to doing so. See Second Article 1128
Submission of Mexico, at 15, ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/1 (July 22, 2002) ("'[T]he conduct . . . must amount to gross
misconduct, manifest injustice or in the classic words of the Neer claim, an
outrage, bad faith or the wilful neglect of duty,"' yet the standard is relative and
"conduct which may not have offended international law [in] the 1920's might very
well be seen to offend internationally accepted principles today."), available at
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/ADF/ADFMexico 1128PostHearingSub.pdf
(last visited July 29, 2005).
98. A sobering reminder of the ability of states to harken back to former eras is
the recently concluded bilateral agreement between the United States and
Australia, which fully omits an investor-state dispute mechanism. See Free Trade
Agreement, Aug. 3, 2004, U.S.-Austl., ch. 11, available at http://naftaclaims.com
/Disputes/USA/ADF/ADFFinalAward.pdf (last visited July 29, 2005).

